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Abstract. In this report a formal representation and a defeasible reasoning approach for 
multi-party contractual agreements is presented. Starting from a representation of elec­
tronic contracts in Event Calculus, we propose a mapping to a representation in Default 
Logic. The proposed contract language allows us to reason defeasibly with e-contracts, 
which is useful in order to determine or explain the normative state of a business ex­
change in the presence of incomplete or inaccurate knowledge.
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1 Introduction
Extensive research, during the last decade, has focused on the establishment and 
subsequent monitoring of contractual agreements in electronic marketplaces (or so 
called e-markets) (for example, cf. [13, 1, 12, 19] among many others). Generally, e- 
contracting is viewed by many researchers as conducted within an e-market, which 
offers a variety of services, such as: brokering to identify and match prospective 
business partners; negotiation facilitation; lodging of electronic documents; arbitra­
tion and dispute resolution; contract performance monitoring and enforcement. In 
this report we are concerned with the latter that is with the development of appropri­
ate e-market services for contract performance monitoring and enforcement.
During a business transaction that is regulated by some agreement, the main issues 
of interest for contract performance monitoring seem to be:
(i) To establish what each party is obliged (or permitted, or prohibited, or empow­
ered and so on) to do at a given point in time;
(ii) To determine whether each party complies with the behaviour stipulated for it 
by the agreement; where a party deviates from prescribed behaviour— 
intentionally or due to force majeure—to determine what, if any, remedial 
mechanisms are applicable that might return the business exchange to a normal 
course; and
(iii) To detect potential conflicts among parties’ obligations (or permissions, prohibi­
tions or powers and so on); when a conflict is detected, to provide a way out 
through some conflict resolution mechanism
Many researchers adopt a process view of electronic contracts, that is, they regard 
them as sets of norms that map out the possible states, in which the actual correspond­
ing business exchanges that are regulated by them may find themselves (for an exam­
ple, cf. [8]), and some researchers (for example, [18, 3, 9, 15], among others) have 
adopted Event Calculus [16] to represent and reason with e-contracts. Such represen­
tations allow us to address issues (i) and (ii) and partly (iii). However, a representa­
tion in Event Calculus does not facilitate reasoning with partial or incomplete knowl­
edge, hypothetical reasoning, and, finally, it does not help towards conflict resolution.
Recently, to address these issues, attention has turned to the deployment of defea­
sible reasoning (e.g. [12, 11, 22]), using mainly Defeasible Logic [21], We investi­
gate an alternative approach, in which we use Reiter’s Default Logic [25], and pro­
pose a mapping from the Event Calculus representation of an e-contract to default 
rules, extended with priorities [5, 6], The resulting representation enables us to per­
form both defeasible deductive reasoning (prediction) and abductive reasoning (ex­
planation). The former allows us to establish what norms are active at a given point in 
time, based on assumptions and/or knowledge of actions that have already taken 
place. The latter allows us to explain and justify the norms that are active at a given 
state of the business exchange. Furthermore, dynamic conflict management, based on 
a preferential default theory, is also possible. Apart from this, reasoning about the 
violation of normative propositions and their potential reparations is also facilitated.
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The rest of the report is organized as follows: section 2 introduces an example 
scenario, which we use for illustration purposes; section 3 discusses briefly the repre­
sentation of an e-contract in Event Calculus; section 4 shows how the Event Calculus 
representation may be mapped to default rules and how conflict detection and resolu­
tion may be performed; finally, sections 5 and 6 present related work, conclusions 
and directions for future research.
2 Example Scenario
For the purposes of illustration consider a 3-party business transaction that takes 
place in an e-market. A retailer requires some goods and for that reason its agent (RA) 
communicates with a wholesaler’s agent (WA) and establishes an agreement for the 
provision of such goods. Consequently, the wholesaler’s agent (WA) communicates 
with a carrier’s agent (CA) and establishes an agreement for the timely and safe deliv­
ery of the goods from the wholesaler to the retailer. There are two interdependent 
agreements here, one between RA and WA, and another between WA and CA.
The first agreement is to be conducted on the following terms: The WA should see 
to it that the goods be delivered to the RA within 10 days from commencement (e.g., 
the date RA's order takes place). The RA, in turn, should see to it that payment be 
made within 21 days from the date it receives the goods. If the WA does not deliver 
on time, then a fixed amount is to be deducted from the original price of the goods for 
each day of delay and it should see to it that delivery be made by a new deadline, say 
within the next 3 days. If the RA does not perform payment on time, then a fixed 
amount is to be added to the original price of the goods for each day of delay and it 
should see to it that payment be made by a new deadline, say within the next 5 days. 
In the same spirit, the second agreement between WA and CA defines obligations, 
their deadlines and possible reparations in case of violations. Following [8], we may 
take an informal, process view of the business transaction that is regulated by the 
agreements. Each state offers a (possibly partial) description of the factual and nor­
mative propositions that hold true in it. A transition between states corresponds to an 
event that takes place, i.e. an action that one of the parties performs or omits to per­
form. Part of such a description of the business exchange is shown in figure 1.
State SO (time point TO) is the initial state, no events have occurred yet. Let us as­
sume that the RA places an order at some time after TO. The transaction is now at state 
SI, where the WA is obliged, towards the RA to see to it that goods be delivered to the 
RA within 10 days. The C4’s obligation towards the WA to deliver goods within 10 
days is, also, active at state SI (time point 77). If the CA delivers within the specified 
time bounds, then the business exchange moves to state S2, where its obligation (and 
the dependent WA’s obligation towards the RA) is successfully discharged, and the 
RA’s obligation towards the WA to pay becomes active (as does the WA’s obligation 
to pay the CA). If the CA does not deliver on time, then the transaction is in state S3 
(time point T3), where the WA must make amends to the RA as specified by their 
agreement (and the CA must make amends to the WA as specified by their agree­
ment). Similarly, when the business exchange finds itself at state S2 (time point T2), 
the RA’s obligation towards the WA to perform payment within 21 days holds. Com­
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pliance with this obligation will lead the exchange to state S4, whereas violation will 
take it to state S5. In the same manner we may discuss other states of the business 
exchange.
Fig. 1. Possibly partial contract state diagram
3 A Representation in Event Calculus
The Event Calculus (EC) [16] allows the representation of actions and reasoning 
about their effects. The basic elements of the language are time points, fluents and 
actions (or else events).
Each state of a business exchange may be associated with a time point and expres­
sions of the form timei<timel+ / indicate the temporal ordering of time points.
Fluents are factual and normative propositions whose truth value alters over time. 
For our example scenario we use propositions, such as Order (agent l,agent2). Deliv­
ery (agentl,agent2) and Payment(agentl,agent2), to denote that events/actions of 
ordering (AOrder(agent 1 ,agent2)), delivering (ADelivery(agentl,agent2)) and pay­
ment (.APayment(agentl,agent2')) from agent 1 to agent2 have successfully been per­
formed.
We use expressions of the form Op(agentl,agent2, action, time) to denote norma­
tive propositions that describe that agentl is in legal relation Op towards agent2, to 
perform action by time. The legal relation Op may be obligation, prohibition or per­
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mission. We use these notions as they are understood in Standard Deontic Logic 
(SDL) [7, 27],
We adopt the simple EC formalism presented in [26], which uses six basic predi­
cates (Table 1) defined in a domain-independent manner.
Table 1. Event Calculus Predicates
Initiates(action fluent,time) fluent starts to hold after action occurs at time.
Terminates (action fluent, time) fluent stops to hold after action occurs at 
time.
HoldsAt(fluent, time) fluent holds at time.
Happens (action, time) (instantaneous) action occurs at time.
Clipped(timel fluent,time2) fluent is terminated between timel and time2.
Declipped(time 1,fluent, time2) fluent is activated between timel and time2.
In [20] six domain independent axioms were introduced. We present here only the 
positive expressions of the Clipped and HoldAt predicates and later on we purpose an 
extension for the e-contracting normative domain. In particular. Clipped and HoldsAt 
predicates were defined as follows:
Clipped(time 1,fluent, time 2)=3action, time [Happens (action, time)
Atimel£ time<time2ATerminates(agentfluent, time2)],
HoldsAt(fluent,time2)*—[Happens(action, timel) Alnitiates(action,fluent,timel)
Atimel<time2 A^Clippedflme l fluent,time2)]
and
HoldsAtfluent, time2)*—[ Holds A t (fluent, time!)
Atime l<time2A^Clipped(time I fluent,time2)]
The agreement between the RA and the WA may be represented as follows:
Initiates(AOrder(RA, WA), Obligation (WA JRAA De livery (WA,RA), time+10), time)
*—Happens(AOrder(RA, WA), time).
Initiates(ADelivery(WA,RA),Obligation(RA,WA,APayment(RA,WA),time+21),time)
*—Happens(ADelivery(WA,RA), time). 
Termnates(ADelivery(WA,RA),Obligation(WA,RA,ADelivery(WA,RA),time+10),time)
Happens (ADe livery(WA ,RA), time). 
Termnates(APayment(RA,WA),Obligation(RA,WA,APayment(RA,WA),time+21),time)
*-Happens(APayment(RA, WA), time).
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Marin et al, [18] distinguish between the so called internal time of norms (e.g. the 
deadline for an obligation to be met), which in our representation is the time that 
appears in the normative propositions of the form Opiagentl, agent2, action, time) and 
the so called external time of norms, i.e. the time at which a normative proposition 
comes into force or ceases to hold.
In our example, initially, the following is true:
-,HoldsAt(Order(RA,WA), TO).
Then, suppose that the RA places an order by time T<T1. Using the representation 
above and the definition of the HoldsAt predicate we may infer that:
HoldsAt(Order (RA, WA), Tl)
HoldsAt(ObligationflVA ,RA,ADelivery(WA,RA), T+10),T1)
which corresponds to state SI. In similar spirit, suppose that WA delivers goods by 
time T'<T2, so
HoldsAt(Delivery(WA,RA), T2)
HoldsAt(Obligation(RA, WA,APayment(RA, WA), T+21), T2) 
which corresponds to state S2. Finally, suppose that RA pays WA on time, that is 
HoldsAt(Payment(RA, WA),T4) 
is true in state S4.
3.1 The effects of Actions in Norm-governed Settings
In [17] it is noted that the effects of an action apply only when the action is consid­
ered valid. Whether an action is considered valid depends on whether its actor has:
(i) the legal ability (power, [14]) to perform it,
(ii) permission to exercise this power, and
(iii) practical ability to perform the action.
We consider legal ability as introduced in [14] that is institutionalized power to 
perform an action. The term permission refers to the normative notion of permission 
as defined by SDL. As argued in [17, 14], although the notion of institutionalized 
power is close to the deontic notion of permission, it is imperative to consider them as 
two distinct notions. This argument can be easily substantiated with a simple example 
in relation with our case study scenario. Assume a retailer’s agent that is legally em­
powered with the ability to perform payment on behalf of the contractual party it 
represents. But, the same agent is not permitted to perform payment if the transferred 
amount of money overcomes a specific value (i.e. 10.000 euros). Based on this exam­
ple, we consider that the agent has the institutionalized power to perform an action as 
a general rule. Exceptions to this rule are also applicable by defining permissions that
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probably apply only at specific time points, time periods or occasions. We should 
note that an exception is not practically able to block an agent to perform an action, 
i.e., the action’s outcome will count as valid. As Artikis argued in [3] an action is 
considered as valid, or in other words effective, if the agent had the institutionalized 
power to perform it. Later on, we enhance this definition by concluding one more 
prerequisite for valid actions.
We use expressions of the form IPower(agent, action) to denote that agent is insti­
tutionally empowered to perform action. We also use expressions of the form PAb- 
lity(agent,action) to denote that agent is physically/practically capable of performing 
action.
We have slightly modified the original definition of the Happens predicate to take 
these points into account and formulate rules that characterize actions as performable 
(or not), valid (or not), and legal (or not). In our representation the Happens predi­
cate includes the actor of the action that occurs, i.e. it takes the form Hap- 
pensiagent, action, time).
Action is performable/possible by its performer at a given time, if agent has the 
practical ability to perform it at that time:
Possible (agent, action, time) = HoldsAt(Possible (agent, action), time)=
Sagent, action, time [HoldsAt(PAbility (agent, action), time)]
For example, if an agent is practically capable of accepting the delivery of some prod­
ucts we may conclude that the action of delivery is possible to happen. But what is 
the case, in the e-marketplace, if the receiver was not authorized for that action. Shall 
we count the action of delivery as possible to occur or as occurred?
Therefore, action is only considered valid, in the sense of being effec­
tive/countable in the overall framework, if agent is legally empowered and physically 
able to perform it:
Valid(agent,action, time) = HoldsAt(Valid(agent,action), time)=
Hagent, action, time[HoldsAt(lPower (agent, action), time) 
/\HoldsAt(Pability(agent, action), time)
Back to our example, if the agent that receives products is, capable and authorized, 
then we may conclude that the obligation of delivery has been successfully met.
Additionally, action is considered legal, if it is valid and no specific forbiddance 
for its performer is explicitly stated:
Legal (agent, action, time) = HoldsAt(Legal(agent, action), time)=
3agent,action,time[HoldsAt(Valid(agent,action),time) 
λ-' ( IIoldsAtHPermission(agent,action),time)) \/ 
HoldsAt(Forbiddance(agent, action), time) )]
For example, the doorman of a company is empowered to receive all packages except 
those that are explicitly sent to the company director. This is the case where an excep­
tion, in the form of a forbiddance, is in force. If the doorman receives a package
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while he is not permitted to do so, then this will count as a valid action, but the door­
man will have violated the company’s internal rule.
Consequently, we have modified Shanahan’s definitional axioms (for Clipped and 
Declipped predicates) and principles (for HoldsAt and ‘Ho Ids At predicates) by in­
cluding the performing party as an input parameter and the notions of institutional­
ized power, permission and practical ability. For instance, the Clipped and HoldsAt 
predicates are now defined as follows (the other two axioms change accordingly):
Clipped(timel,fluent, time 2)=3agent, action, time [Happens(agent,action, time)
Atimel<time<time2/\Terminates(agentfluent,time2) 
AHoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)]
and
HoldsAt(fluent,time2)<—[Happens (agent,action, time l)/\Initiates(actionfluent, time 1)
Atime l<time2 A'Clipped(lime 1 fluent,time2) 
AHoldsAt(Valid (agent, action), time)]
Now, the HoldsAt predicate means that fluent is true at time2 if action occurred by a 
legally empowered and practically able agent at an earlier time point time l, this ac­
tion initiated fluent and the fluent has not been set to false during the interval between 
time1 and time2.
During this work, we consider that initially all partiers are practically empowered 
to perform actions in order to fulfil their obligations. We follow this approach be­
cause practical inability mainly concerns exogenous parameters, such as the absence 
of the product receiver or the lack of network/bank account or others in a similar 
sense that cannot be predicted. In the same way, we treat permissions. According to 
the common sense law of inertia, an agent is not permitted or is forbidden to perform 
an action, only if there is an explicit predicate that supports it. Regardless of whether 
this is the case or not, continuous checking of what is permitted or not cannot block 
the effects of actions that have occurred, but it can only point out illegal actions.
On the other hand, the continuous verification procedure of what is valid and re­
spectively what is legal is imperative. This is due to the fact that invalid actions can­
not affect the state of a transaction. As a result, we are only concerned with actions 
that can affect the current state of the electronic institution, and those actions are the 
ones that are valid irrespectively of whether they are legal or illegal.
3.2 Contrary to Duty Structures
Another point worth mentioning concerns the so called Contrary-To-Duty structures 
(CTDs) [24], CTDs arise when a primary obligation is defined for a party, along with 
a rule that determines a secondary obligation for it, should the primary one be vio­
lated. For instance, in our example, the WA is obliged to deliver within 10 days from 
the date the RA’s order is placed. If it does not do so, then it is obliged to deliver 
within the next 3 days and to claim a reduced price.
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HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2, raction, time 3), time 2) 
A'HoldsAt(Obligation(agent],agent2,action, time 1), time 2)
*—[HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl,agent2,action,time 1),time 1) 
/\ -^Happens (agent 1, action, time) 
Atime<timel<time2<time3 
/\HoldsAt (Valid(agent 1, action), time)]
The CTD axiom states that, if agent 1 had an obligation to perform action up to a 
specific time point and, furthermore, this action was valid in the sense that the agent 
had the legal and practical ability to perform it, in order to meet its obligation, but it 
was not performed till the deadline, then this obligation ceases to hold and a new 
obligation, holds.
We should note, that during this work it is not our purpose to analyse all possible 
cases of CTD structures as presented in [24]. We do not address matters relating to 
the persistence of norms or indeed periodicity. We assume that when primary obliga­
tions are violated, some reparation action (raction) may be specified, for instance 
reparation delivery (RADelivery) and reparation payment (RAPayment).
Another point worth mentioning is that the notions of legal and practical power to 
perform an action have a key role in CTD structures. For instance, during the case of 
a contract violation from an agent that was not empowered to perform the obligatory 
action the contract representation formalism should provide an alternative reparation 
taking into account the fact that the agent was not able to meet its obligations. Similar 
to the previous case, we consider all possible cases under the term of reparation ac­
tion (raction% so the derived axiom follows the form shown below:
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2, raction [time 3), time 2) 
λ AIoldsAt(Obligation(agentl,agent2,action,timel),time2)
*-[HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl,agent2, action, time 1), timel) 
λ -'Happens (agent 1, action, time) 
Atime<timel<time2<time3 
A~^HoldsAt(Valid(agentl, action), time)]
As can be observed, we may reformulate the two CTD axioms in one that is 
shorter and more general than the initial ones. We do not use such a shorthand, be­
cause by using two separate axioms we may distinguish explicitly between repara­
tions that arise due to deviations from prescribed behaviour as a result of the lack of 
practical or institutional ability, and reparations that arise as a result of violations that 
occur due to other reasons.
3.4 Contract Representation Language
Based on what were mentioned so far, we are able to derive an EC-based contract 
representation first order language LA (FOL) that consists of well-formed formulae 
(wff) over an alphabet A. The alphabet A consists of variables denoted by lowercase
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letters such as action,fluent,time,agent,..., primitive predicates denoted with initial 
capital letters as the ones shown in the following list:
• Initiates(action fluent, time), denoting that fluent starts to hold after action occurs at 
timet.
• Term 'mates(actionfluent, time), denoting that fluent stops to hold after action oc­
curs at time.
• HoldsAt(fluent,time), denoting that fluent holds at time.
• Happens (agent, action, time), denoting that instantaneous action action is being 
occurred by agent at time.
• Clipped(timel fluent, time2), denoting that fluent is terminated between time points 
time1 and time2.
• Declipped(time 1 fluent, time2), denoting that fluent is activated between time points 
time I and time2.
• AOrder(agentl,agent2), denoting that agentl orders form agent2.
• ADelivery(agentl,agent2), denoting that agentl delivers to agent2.
• APayment(agentl,agent2), denoting that agentl pays agent2.
• Order(agentl,agent2), denoting that agentl ordered form agent2.
• Delivery (agent l,agent2), denoting that agentl delivered to agent2.
• Payment(agentl,agent2), denoting that agentl paid agent2.
• Obligation(agentl,agent2,action,time), denoting that agentl is obliged against 
agent2 to perform action until time.
• Permission(agent,action), denoting that agent is permitted to perform action.
• Forbiddance(agent,action), denoting that agent is prohibited to perform action.
• PAbility (agent,action), denoting that agent is practically empowered/has the physi­
cal power to perform action.
• IPower(agent,action), denoting that agent is institutionalized empowered/has the 
institutionalized power to perform action.
• Possible (agent, action), denoting that action is performable by agent.
• Valid(agent,action), denoting that action is concerned as valid when performed by 
agent.
• Legal(agent,action), denoting that action is concerned as legal when performed by 
agent.
and constants such as RA, WA,... for agents and T,T1,T2,... for time points. Moreover, 
it consists of logical constants such as -> for classical negation, λ for conjunction, v 
for disjunction and <— for implication.
A variation of the simple EC, enhanced with new predicates that specify new do­
main dependent defmitions/axioms and new domain independent axioms, is finally 
adjusted as follows:
Clipped(timel,fluent, time 2)=Paction, time [Happens (agent, action, time) ^
Atime I <time<time2 ATerminates(agent,fluent,time 2) 
/\HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)]
Declipped(time 1,fluent, time2)=Paction, time [Happens(action, time) ^
Atime 1< time<time2Alnitiates(agent,fluent, time 2)
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AHoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)]
Possible(agent, action, time)=
HoldsAt(Possible (agent, action), time)=
Ehgent, action, time[HoldsAt(PAbility (agent, action), time)]
Valid(agent, action, time)=
HoldsA t(Valid(agent, action), time)=
Eiagent, action, time[HoldsAt(IPower(agent, action), time) 
aHο Ids A t(P ability (agent, action), time)
Legal(agent,action,time)=
HoldsAt(Legal(agent, action), time)=
Eiagent,action,time[HoldsAt(Valid(agent,action),time) 
λ~· ( HoldsAt(~Permission(agent,action),time)) v 
HoldsAt(Forbiddance(agent, action), time) )]
timel<time2
HoldsAtfluent, time 2)
[Happens (agent, action, time 1) Alnitiates(actionfluent, time 1) 
Atimel<time2A-^Clipped(timel,fluent,time 2) 
AHoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time 1)]
HoldsAtfluent, time 2)
<—[Happens(agent, action, time l)ATerminates(action,fluent, time 1) 
Atimel <time2A^Declipped(time 1 fluent, time2) 
AHoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time 1)]
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl,agent2,raction,time3),time2) 
A^HoldsAt(Obligation(agenti,agent2,action, time 1), time 2)
<—[HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl,agent2,action, time 1), time 1) 
aHIappens(agent I, action, time) 
Atime<timel <time2<time3 
AHoldsAt(Valid (agent 1, action), time)]
HoldsAt fluent,time2)*—[ HoldsAtfluent, time 1)
Atime I <time2A^Clipped(time I fluent, time 2)]
HoldsAt fluent,time2)*—[ HoldsAt fluent, time 1)
Mime 1 <time2A~^Declipped(time 1,fluent, time2)J
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Axioms (1) - (5) are definitional ones, which determine the effects of actions on 
fluents or on the overall institutionalized framework. Axioms (7) and (8) correspond 
to direct effects of occurring events and thus the shifting from one state to the other. 
Axiom (9) is a contrary to duty structure that reassigns obligations to contractual 
parties. Axioms (10) and (11) express the common sense law of inertia, expressing 
the persistence of fluents during the absence of events that influence their values.
3.5 Comments
A representation in Event Calculus, allows us to establish what each party is obliged 
(or permitted, forbidden, empowered) to do at a given time point. It also allows us to 
determine whether each party complies with the agreement, and what, if any, repara- 
tory mechanisms are stipulated, should violations arise. This may be achieved 
through appropriate queries on the HoldsAt predicate. We may, also, spot potential 
conflicts, for example if such a query returns that a particular agent is both obliged 
and forbidden to perform a specific action at the same time.
What we cannot do is reason based on incomplete and partial knowledge, or based 
on assumptions and, moreover to retract previous conclusions in the presence of new 
knowledge. For example, in the absence of explicit knowledge about legal or practi­
cal ability, permission or prohibition to perform actions or even changes in the world, 
parties may assume that the optimal (for them) conditions hold, during the contract 
performance phase, and plan their actions accordingly. But later in the presence of 
new information, parties should be able to update their beliefs and retract previous 
conclusions. For instance, suppose we are the RA agent. In the absence of knowledge 
to the contrary, at a given time point, we may assume that CA is able to deliver goods 
on time, and based on this, we may infer the exact time point our obligation to pay 
will be in force. Suppose that later on, we find out that CA cannot deliver because 
nobody (on our part) was present to take the delivery. This new fact should change 
our view of the world, and any inferences we made so far. Also, although we may 
spot potential conflicts, by examining what normative propositions hold at a given 
state, we have no way to resolve them dynamically. We now turn our attention to 
these issues.
4 Defeasible Reasoning with e-Contracts
Defeasible reasoning allows for non-monotonic, inference with incomplete/uncertain 
knowledge based on assumptions and, when enhanced with priorities, conflict man­
agement. In this section, we describe a mapping from the EC representation to default 
rules, where we adopt Reiter’s Default Logic (DfL) [25] and Brewka’s priority set­
tlement between default rules [5, 6].
A default rule has the form:
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where P is the prerequisite, J~{JhJ2,·· J„) is a set of justifications and C is the de­
rived consequent. The semantics of this inference rule is: If P holds and the assump­
tion J is consistent with our current knowledge, then C may be inferred. Defaults of 
the form P:C/C are called normal. A Default Theory (DfT) is a pair of the form 
(D,W), where W is a set of closed wffs that hold, and are called as background 
knowledge, while D is a set of defaults. A rule is applicable to a set of formulae EczW 
if and only if P eE and -1I„gE [25]. In this case, the set E is called extension of
the default theory. Extensions are the most complicated concept of Reiter’s default 
theory because it is hard to determine an accurate belief set for which justifications 
should be consistent. In Reiter’s initial paper for DfL [25] three important properties 
of extensions were referred. In particular, an extension A of a default theory (D, W):
(i) should contain W,
(ii) should be deductively closed and
(iii) for a default rule of the form P: JhJ2,... Jn / C, if P eE and -\Jh..., -J„ 0E then 
C eE.
In this work we consider a grounded DfT, that is a theory where defaults contain no 
free variables and we derive extensions in the manner presented in [2],
4.1 Translation Schema
We may map our EC representation onto default rules. The specific mapping depends 
on what information is available in the knowledge base about a particular domain. 
For example, the definition of the HoldsAt/2 predicate may correspond to the follow­
ing default:
Initiates (action,fluent, timel), 
time1 < time2,
Happensfa&nt,action,time!) i
—Clipped(timel, fluent, time2), 
HoldsAt(Valid(agent,action), timel) 
HoldsAt(fiient,time2)
It may also be seen as the following default rule:
timel < time2.
Happens (agent, action, tim el)
I —iClipped(timel, fluent, time2),
f\lnitiates(action, fluent,timel)
HoldsAt(Valid(agent,action),timel), 
HoldsAtffluent, time 2)
or even as :
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Happens (aypnt, action,tim el) 
λ Initiates(action,fluent,timel) : 
λ —Clipped(tmel, fluent,time2)
timel<time2,
IloldsAt(Valid(agent,action),time I)
HoldsAt(flient,time2)
A fourth possibility is to view it as a normal default, that is:
Happens (dgnt,actionfim el) a timel< time2 
λ Ini dates faction Jlu entpmel) 
a —Clipped(tmel,fluentJ;ime2)
/\HoldsAt(Valid(agentflction)}imel)
: HoldsAt(fluent,time2)
HoldsAt(fluent,time2)
Knowledge that we want to be proved from the knowledge base is mapped to the 
prerequisites part of the default rule, while knowledge that is absent from the knowl­
edge base and may be assumed is mapped to the justifications part of the default rule. 
The mapping to normal defaults is, of course, stricter. We are currently investigating 
ways in which the mapping from the EC representation to defaults may be 
(semi)automated.
Before mentioning the reasoning approaches and their applications, we should de­
fine a DfT for the contract domain in respect with the LA language presented in sec­
tion 3. Thus, a default contract theory is a pair of (D,W) where W is a set of FOL facts 
and strict if-then rules and D is a set of default rules. We consider three classes of 
default rules in respect with their use. The first one is default rules as presented in 
Reiter’s initial work and above. The second class are again strict rules that do not 
belong in the belief set W, but m the D set. Default strict rules can be represented as 
justification-free defaults of the form P: /C. Finally the third class is the so called 
priority rules. Priority rule comes to enhance the default theory with priorities that 
stand among classical defaults. Brewka in [5, 6] first introduced Prioritised Default 
Logic and we follow some of those early ideas in order to provide dynamic priori­
tized conflict management to our contractual domain as shown below.
To sum up, the proposed default contract theory contains:
• Facts as presented in the EC formalism. For example: Holds(Order(RA, WA),T)
• Strict rules, also in respect with the EC language and represented either as predi­
cate logic implication rules or as DfL justification-free defaults. It is worth noting 
that retractable reasoning is not possible in the first case.
• Default rules as presented above.
• Priority rules whose conclusion is a priority relation that stands among defaults as 
noted below. Priority rules can be formulated either as strict rules or as defaults.
We should also note down that exceptions, as they were described in section 3, can
be easily and expressively represented as default rules with justifications. For exam­
ple, we can enhance axiom (7) with a justification to represent the agent’s permission 
(or forbiddance) to perform an action.
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Initiates (action, fluent, time 1), 
timel < time2,
Happens(agent,action,timel) l -,Clipped(timel, fluent, time2),
HoldsA t(Vdid (agent, action), timel), 
HoldsAt(Permission(agent,action),timel) 
HoldsA t (fluent, time 2)
4.2 Deductive Reasoning
DfL enables us to reason with incomplete knowledge, by deriving conclusions that 
are based on consistent assumptions, which may be retracted later, in the presence of 
new information. There are two approaches to perform such inference. In the first 
one, the sceptical reasoning, a formula is entailed by a default theory, if it is derived 
by all its extensions. This is a strict approach and requires the computation of all 
possible extensions and subsequent check to determine if a formula belongs in all of 
them. We may adopt this approach to implement a planning and advisory tool that 
could be used during the contract formation phase. In the second approach, the credu­
lous reasoning, a formula is entailed by a default theory, if it is derived by at least one 
extension. Such an approach might be useful to implement a ‘what-to-do-next’ tool, 
which could be used during the contract enforcement phase, to support decision­
making when violations or conflicting obligations arise. We adopt the operational 
definition of extensions of [2], as explained below, which uses Reiter’s original defi­
nition of extensions and derives them by maintaining sets of formulae.
Given a closed DfT (W,D) and considering a finite or infinite set of defaults 
DS=(DR1, DR2,...) from D extensions are easily derived by formulating two sets. 
The first one, denoted as In(DS), is populated by what was initially believed and 
everything that is concluded when adding a new default in the DS set. We should 
note that a default can only be applied once. The second set, denoted as Out(DS), is 
populated with formulae that were assumed to be false (the negation of justifications 
formulae) and that finally should not turn out to be true. According to this approach 
the set In(DS) is an extension of the default theory iff DS is successfotl and closed. 
The two properties of the DS set are defined as follows: DS is successful iff In(DS) 
and Out(DS) have no formula in common (In(DS)C\Out(DS) =0), while DS is closed 
iff every applicable default of the default theory already occurs in DS.
For example, consider the default theory (W,D) with:
W= {-HoldsAt(Order(RA, WA), TO), Happens(RA,AOrder(RA, WA),T), T0<T} 
and D includes the following closed defaults (DR1, DR2, DR3 respectively):
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Happens (RA, AOrder(RA, WA), T)
T0<T<T1<TX
Initiates(AOrder(RA,WA),Obligation(WA,RA,ADelivery(WA,RA),T3),T), 
—Clipped(T, Obligation(WA,RA, ADelivery(WA,RA), T3),
HoldsAt(Valid(RA,AOrder(RA,WA)),T)_______________
HoldsAt(Obligation(WA, RA, ADelivery(WA, RA),T1)
Happens (RA,AOrder(RA, WA),T)
•
Initates(AOrder(RA, WA), Causes(AOrder(RA, WA), AOrder(WA,CA)), T),
_______________HoldsAt(Valid(RA, AOrder(RA, WA)),T)_______________
HoldsA t(Ca uses(AOrder(RA, WA), A Order(WA, CA)), T)
Happens (RA, AOrder(RA, WA), T) 
λ HoldsAt(Causes(AOrder(RA, WA),AOrder(WA,CA)), T)
HoldsAt(Valid(RA, AOrder(RA, WA)), T),
HoldsAt(Valid(WA, AOrder(WA, CA)), T)
Happens (WA,AOrder(WA,CA),T)
For the purposes of illustration we use a special predicate called Causes/2. The for­
mulae Causes(actionl,action2) denotes that the occurrence of action1 causes action2 
to occur or in other words that action2 is being caused by action1.
DS {DR1}, DS={DR2}, DS={DR1, DR2} or DS={DR2, DR3} are successful but 
not closed because (DR2, DR3), (DR3, DR1), (DR3) and (DR1), respectively, are also 
applicable. DS={DR1, DR2, DR3} is closed and successful and therefore it may be 
considered as an extension. Moreover, consider that the above default theory is en­
hanced with the normal default DR4:
true : -,HoldsAt(Valid(WA,AOrder(WA,CA)),T) 
—iHoldsAt(Valid(WA,AOrder(WA,CA)),T)
In this case if DR4 applies before DR2 or DR3 then its consequent 
^HoldsAt(Valid(WA,AOrder(WA,CA)),T) will block the firing of DR3. Although a 
causal relation holds and consequently an indirect event should fire this specific ex­
ception blocks its occurrence.
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4.3 Abductive Reasoning
DfL can also be used for abductive reasoning and serve as the basis for a tool that 
explains the factual and normative propositions that hold at various contractual states. 
The problem takes the form: given a formula F and a default theory (W,D), can we 
prove that F can be explained? Reiter proposed an algorithm for this kind of (back­
ward) reasoning, based on linear resolution [25], which is also discussed in detail in 
Poole [23],
Consequently, we only point out the outlines of abduction using closed normal de­
faults. What we really search for is a set DS c:D such that from Wucons(D) we may 
imply F, where cons(DS) is the set of consequents of all rules that are present in DS. 
The algorithm, in short, for proving that formula F is valid is:
• put ~'F in a form where only disjunction relations exists and derive a finite set 
of literals representing those disjunctions (for example, from the AaB formula 
by applying De Morgan’s law comes up Αν~Έ that is equal to the set {A, ^B})
• take a set of clauses C in conjunction normal form (CNF) which results form 
the W^com(D) set and apply linear resolution
• repeat the same procedure trying to explain the preconditions of each default 
that were used in the proof
• if eventually we get ± (refutation) and Wucons(D) is consistent that means that
is not satisfied, or in other words that F is valid; otherwise F is not valid
Consider, now the example shown in the previous section on deductive reasoning 
and reformulate all defaults to turn out as normal defaults. Can we explain Hap- 
pens(WA,AOrder(WA,CA),T) from the default theory (W,D), where 
W= {-Ho Ids At (Order (RA, WA), TO), IIappens(RA,AOrder(RA, WA). T), T0<T, ...all 
other formulae related with, validness and value’s initiation/persistence...) and 
D={DR1,DR2,DR3} in their normal form? In this case 
FHIappens(WA,AOrder(WA,CA), T) and C={-HoldsAt(Order(RA,WA), TO), Hap- 
pens(RA,AOrder(RA,WA),T), T0<T, ...all other formulae related with, validness and 
value’s initiation/per si stence..., {HoldsAt(Obligation(WA,RA,ADelivery(WA,RA),
T3),T1),DR1}, {Holds(Causes(AOrder(RA,WA),AOrder(WA,CA)),T),DR2}, {Hap- 
pens(WA,AOrder(WA,CA),T),DR3}}. By applying linear resolution in order to prove F 
we have that Wucons(DRl,DR2,DR3) and WLA?ons(DR2,DR3) are two possible sets 
that are consistent and proofs for Happens(WA,AOrder(li'A,CA), T).
4.4 Conflict Detection
We are interested in developing a mechanism that may facilitate agents to deal with 
conflicts that may arise during a business transaction, i.e. to detect them and, if possi­
ble, to resolve them.
An agent faces a potential conflict if the transaction is in a state, where contradic­
tory normative propositions hold. For instance consider a state, where two proposi­
tions of the following form hold:
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2,action,time2),time 1)
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HoldsAt(~Obligation(agentl, agent2,action, time3), time 1)
During the interval AT=[timel ,mm(time2,time3)\, the agent cannot decide whether 
to satisfy the norm stipulated by the first proposition and do the action that is obli­
gated or to behave in accordance with the second norm, which essentially permits it 
either to do action or not to do action (and do something else) or to remain idle.
Another case where an agent faces a potential conflict is where the transaction is in 
a state where two propositions of the following form hold:
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2, action, time2), time 1) 
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2, ^action,time3),time 1)
During the interval AT, the agent faces the dilemma whether to do action or to do 
action; we do not make, at present, any attempt to characterize formally what is 
meant by “negative action”, and treat informally such an expression as meaning “not 
doing action but doing something else instead, or doing nothing”.
A third possibility for an agent to face a conflict is where two propositions of the 
following are true in a state:
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent2,action,time2),time 1) 
HoldsAt(Obligation(agentl, agent3,action',time3),time 1)
Here agentl bears two obligations (possibly for two distinct actions) towards two 
distinct agents. Assuming that no parallel action is allowed, during the interval AT the 
agent cannot decide which to fulfill.
There are, of course, other ways in which conflicts may arise, but we do not dis­
cuss this issue here any further. What we want to focus on, instead, is how such con­
flicts may be detected.
A DfL representation of contracts, such as the one we propose, allows us to detect 
conflicts by examining extensions, which are essentially set of propositions. In gen­
eral, a potential conflict arises when there are multiple extensions of a default theory 
that represents a contract, and one of them contains a proposition that conflicts with a 
proposition contained in another; let us call these inter-extension conflicts. Conflicts 
may also arise even when there is a single extension of the default theory, if it con­
tains conflicting propositions; let us call these intra-extension conflicts.
The detection of inter-extension conflicts is useful for an agent, which finds itself 
in a state that is not, yet, problematic, and has alternative courses of action to con­
sider. The agent must decide upon a specific course of action - some way of prevent­
ing the potential conflicts from ever arising is required. The detection of intra­
extension conflicts, on the other hand, essentially informs the agent that it is, already, 
in a problematic state. Again the agent needs a way to resolve the conflict and decide 
which norm to satisfy in a way that minimizes the damage done - since, unavoidably, 
some norm will be violated.
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In the next section we propose a unified way for conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution.
4.5 Conflict Management: Prevention and Resolution
In [5, 6], Brewka proposes a Prioritised Default Theory (PDfT) that enables us to 
define and apply priorities on default rules dynamically. A PDfT is a triple 
(W,D,name), where name is a function that assigns names to default rules D. The 
extension of a PDfT is derived in the same way as in a DfT.
What makes PDfTs really useful is that we may reconsider the priorities of the de­
fault mles, when new conclusions are derived as a result of a rule firing. Using dy­
namic priorities, we generate preferred extensions, where each extension indicates a 
transaction plan. Priorities amongst ground defaults may be defined dynamically by 
specifying domain-dependent conditions of interest.
The general pattern for ascribing priorities dynamically takes the form of a default 
rule:
prule(d" ,[d,d'J,v) =
rule(d, v) λ rule(d' ,v) 
λ HoldsAt(co ndition(v), time)
HoldsAt(d < d' ,time)
HoldsAt(d <d', time)
Here d, d\ d" are variables that denote names of ground defaults; prule(d",[d,d],v) 
is a label denoting a priority-assignment default rale d", which is applied on the de­
faults d, d' and prioritizes them based on some condition that is checked for some set 
of entities of interest v, rule(d,v) denotes a ground default d and its set of entities of 
interest v. The intended interpretation of this rale is: if two defaults d and d' apply and 
some criterion is satisfied at time then d takes priority over d' from that time onwards, 
if this may be consistently assumed.
In this manner, we may manage conflicts in a variety of ways, by specifying dif­
ferent criteria (e g. obligations should be satisfied in the order in which they arise; or 
obligations towards specific agents should be satisfied first etc). We should note that, 
we treat priorities between defaults as fluents, because priority assignment is driven 
by criteria and these may themselves be event-driven. Where some criterion is event- 
independent (e.g. ordering of time points) it need not be treated as a fluent. The fol­
lowing examples illustrate these points.
In the first example, assume that we have two retailers RA and RA' that order 
goods from the same wholesaler WA, but at different time points (T<T'<T1). Conse­
quently, from the WA’s perspective, at state SI (time point 77) two obligations for 
delivery hold. Suppose that only one action may be performed at any given time. In 
this case, the CA agent (who is commissioned by the WA) has two conflicting obliga­
tions to satisfy and two default extensions are derived (E and E' respectively). An 
inter-extension conflict arises:
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rule(DRlT) =
Happens(RA,AOrder(RAWA),T)λT <T1 <T3 
λ Initiates(iOrder(RAJVA),
Obi igation(CA, WA, ADe livery ( CA,RA),T3), T) 
λ —iClipped(T,Obligation(CA,WA,ADelivery( CA,RA),T3),T1)
λ HoldsAt(Valid(RA,AOrder(RAfVA)),T)
HoldsAt(Obligation(CA,WA,ADelivery(CA,RA),T3),Tl)
HoldsAt(Obligation(CA,WA,ADelivery(CA,RA),T3),Tl)
and
rule(DR2,T ) =
Happens(RA', AOrderfRA',WA),T')/\T'< ΤΙ < T3 
λ Initiates(AOrder(RA', WA),
Obligation(CA,WA, ADe livery ( CA,RA' ),T3), T ) 
λ —Clipped(TPbligation(CA,WA,ADelivery( CA,RA' ),T3),T1)
λ HoldsAt(Valid(RA' ,AOrder(RAWA)),T')
HoldsAt(Obligation(CA,WA,ADelivery( CA,RA' ),T3),T1) 
HoldsAt(Obligation(CA,WA,ADelivery( CA,RA' ),T3),T1)
Now, suppose that we use the following normal default rule (PR1) to assign time- 
based priorities:
rule(dr, time) λ rule(dr' ,time') 
λ time < time'
HoldsAt(dr < dr', time')
HoldsAt(dr < dr',time')
This rule gives priority to DR I over DR2 and consequently E is the preferred exten­
sion. The effect is that obligations are met in the order in which they arise.
In the second example, assume that the carrier agent did not deliver goods to any 
of the two ordering agents for some reason. In this case two rules apply. The two 
potential extensions contain conflicting obligations. According to (PR1), E is again 
the preferred extension. But, what would happen, if we had in our initial knowledge 
base a strict rale (PR2) such as the following:
HoldsAt(dr'<dr,time') <— HoldsAt (PC (agent'), time')
λ rule (dr, agent) λ rule (dr', agent')
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This rule defines a priority between defaults based on specific information, in this 
case, that some specific agent is a privileged customer (PC(agent)). In this case, the 
previous default rule (PR 1) that led to extension E is not applicable, because inconsis­
tency with the consequent of the new rule arises. So, according to (PR2) the preferred 
extension is E', and the business transaction will follow an alternative course than the 
one chosen before.
5 Related Work
There are many research attempts that were based on Event Calculus as a tempo­
ral formalism to represent and reason about actions and states of contractual agree­
ments and normative systems. In [18] an analysis of certain temporal aspects of law 
was presented. This work was mainly concerned with the distinction of the so called 
internal and external time of legal norms. Also an extension of the EC was proposed 
in order to overcome some of its limitations. Artikis et al in [3] introduce a represen­
tation in EC of open computational agent societies. This work is concerned with no­
tions of computational systems, such as social constraints, roles and states, and of 
normative social systems, such as institutionalized power, obligation and permission. 
Also a society visualiser was presented that executes a variation of the Contract Net 
Protocol (CNP). Farrell et al in [9] proposed an EC representation of contracts to 
support automatic state tracking of normative states. Obligation, permission and insti­
tutionalized power are the main normative concepts this works concerns with. In 
order to describe the effects, on normative states, of the events that occur during the 
transaction, an ecXML representation based on the XML version of the EC was also 
introduced. In [15] a simple EC representation of contracts was presented. The repre­
sentation was considered in the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture and deals 
with two types of contract’s, short and long contracts, monitoring and execution. 
Contracts violations are being overcome by associating meta-information with them. 
This fact enabled agents to solve potential violations and met their goals by outsourc­
ing. Furthermore an agent architecture in the style of AgentSpeak(L) was also de­
scribed. Those approaches do not, however, address defeasible reasoning.
There are three approaches to defeasible reasoning with e-contracts, besides ours: 
Grosofs [12], Govematori’s [11] and Paschke’s [22], Grosofs SweetDeal is based 
on the SweetRules prototype. This work represents contract’s rules via Situated Cour­
teous Logic Programs (SCLP) that is an extension of Ordinary Logic Programs (OLP) 
with prioritized conflict handling and procedures to perform actions and queries on 
contractual states. Mutual exclusion statements that were added in the knowledge 
base support conflict detection while priorities statements appoint the resolving 
mechanism. Govematori’s and Hoang’s DR-Contract architecture extends DR-Device 
architecture [4] by using defeasible deontic logic of violations (DDLV). DDLV was 
presented in [10] and combines deontic notions with defeasibility and violations. 
Based on Nute’s Defeasible Logic theory [21], four kinds of knowledge are adopted: 
facts; strict rules; defeasible rules, i.e., rules that can be defeated by other mles; supe­
riority relation that defines priority among mles. A special kind of operator was also
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introduced in order to represent CTD structures. ContractLog, introduced by Paschke 
et al, addresses a special kind of contracts called Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
Those are agreements that mainly contain provisions for maintaining service quality. 
This approach combines various theoretical approaches and finally proposes a formal 
representation for contractual agreements together with monitoring and enforcement 
tools. Specifically, an SLA is represented by Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules 
that were enhanced with predicates from EC, for reasoning about actions and their 
effects, and other predicates for deontic notions. A special kind of ECA rule was also 
introduced in order to represent CTD structures. Moreover, three types of conflicts 
were defined: authorization, obligation and application specific conflicts. Conflict 
resolution was addressed i) with the adoption of the four basic types of knowledge as 
were proposed in Nute’s Defeasible Logic theory and by defining static priorities 
among rules and furthermore ii) by considering conditional mutexes as were proposed 
in Grosof s Generalized Courteous Logic Programs (GCLP). ContractLog were im­
plemented based on Mandarax rule engine and the Prova language extension and 
supports both deductive and abductive reasoning. All three approaches propose a 
mapping of their normative rules formalism on RuleML (XML) in order to integrate 
their frameworks with Semantic Web Technology.
Of the three approaches, only ContractLog allows for temporal reasoning. More­
over, in all three, the priorities used to resolve conflicts are statically defined. Finally 
it is not clear, in all three, whether and how abductive inference may be supported.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this report an EC contract representation and a defeasible reasoning approach for 
multi-party contractual agreements were presented. The proposed EC formalism gives 
us the ability to reason about actions and their effects and about normative proposi­
tions that may get activated on potential states of the transaction as the outcome of the 
occurring events. DfL, the logic formulation for defeasible reasoning, gives us the 
ability to make retractable decisions based on assumptions and also helps us to ex­
plain normative relations that are observed on different contractual states. EC and 
DfL were related by the proposed mapping schema from the initial form of rules into 
default rules. Defaults were also enhanced with priorities that modulate a dynamic 
decision taking mechanism. Moreover, our approach considers conflicts between 
contractual normative propositions and proposes a conflict management framework 
that is based on priority settlement and the above mentioned dynamic and defeasible 
decision making mechanism.
We are currently investigating (i) how conflicts may be more precisely character­
ized; and (ii) how the translation from EC to DfL may be (semi)automated. We also 
want to examine in detail how our approach, which uses Reiter’s Default Logic, com­
pares with those that are based on Nute’s Defeasible Logic. Finally, we plan the de­
velopment of a tool, which may be integrated with Semantic Web technologies.
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